MANU
Manchester United plcManchester United plc, together with its subsidiaries, owns and operates a professional sports team in the United Kingdom. The company operates Manchester United Football Club, a professional football club. It develops marketing and sponsorship relationships with international and regional companies to leverage its brand. The company also markets and sells sports apparel, training and leisure wear, and other clothing featuring the Manchester United brand; and sells other licensed products, such
2-Year Price History
Quarterly Financials & Projections
| Period | Rev | EBITDA | OpIn | NI | OCF | FCF | CapEx | Cash | Debt | Shares | ROIC | IntCov | EV/EBITDA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Est | 2028-Q2 | 195.0 | 62.4 | -- | 3.9 | -- | -15.6 | -9.8 | -167.9 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2028-Q1 | 155.0 | 62.0 | -- | -4.7 | -- | -131.8 | -147.3 | -152.3 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q4 | 165.0 | 33.0 | -- | -13.2 | -- | 66.0 | -11.6 | -20.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q3 | 155.0 | 43.4 | -- | -7.8 | -- | -31.0 | -46.5 | -86.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q2 | 185.0 | 55.5 | -- | 1.9 | -- | -18.5 | -9.3 | -55.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q1 | 148.0 | 62.2 | -- | -3.0 | -- | -133.2 | -148.0 | -37.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q4 | 170.0 | 37.4 | -- | -8.5 | -- | 76.5 | -13.6 | 96.2 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q3 | 165.0 | 52.8 | -- | -5.0 | -- | -24.8 | -41.3 | 19.7 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Act | 2026-Q2 | 190.3 | 65.2 | 19.6 | 4.2 | -11.4 | -49.3 | -1.8 | 44.4 | 780.4 | 172.7 | 8.2% | -- | 11.6x |
| Act | 2026-Q1 | 140.3 | 65.4 | 13.0 | -6.7 | -1.8 | -298.9 | -179.6 | 80.5 | 757.7 | 172.4 | 6.0% | 4.7x | 12.8x |
| Act | 2025-Q4 | 164.2 | 40.9 | -15.2 | -3.9 | 100.3 | 55.2 | -10.6 | 86.1 | 645.5 | 172.4 | -8.0% | 4.8x | 9.6x |
| Act | 2025-Q3 | 160.6 | 60.1 | 0.7 | -2.7 | 22.3 | -62.0 | -52.9 | 73.2 | 721.8 | 172.4 | 0.3% | 4.6x | 13.3x |
| Act | 2025-Q2 | 198.7 | 55.9 | 3.1 | -27.8 | -63.2 | -114.5 | -6.9 | 95.5 | 740.2 | 169.8 | 1.4% | 1.3x | 20.5x |
| Act | 2025-Q1 | 143.1 | 72.8 | -7.0 | 1.3 | 13.3 | -265.9 | -164.0 | 149.6 | 722.7 | 169.3 | -3.5% | 3.7x | 16.9x |
| Act | 2024-Q4 | 142.2 | 20.7 | -32.4 | -36.3 | 125.9 | 115.3 | -6.9 | 73.6 | 555.3 | 165.8 | -17.3% | 1.8x | 19.3x |
| Act | 2024-Q3 | 136.7 | -19.5 | -66.3 | -71.5 | -15.1 | -36.8 | -21.6 | 68.3 | 662.6 | 165.8 | -28.0% | -1.4x | 20.3x |
| Act | 2024-Q2 | 225.8 | 81.7 | 27.5 | 20.4 | -46.5 | -85.2 | -38.5 | 62.8 | 781.9 | 163.7 | 10.3% | 4.9x | 14.6x |
| Act | 2024-Q1 | 157.1 | 30.6 | 1.8 | -25.8 | 21.5 | -119.9 | -141.2 | 80.8 | 741.9 | 163.2 | 1.0% | 0.9x | 18.3x |
| Act | 2023-Q4 | 167.3 | 59.0 | -0.3 | -2.9 | 109.3 | 91.9 | -17.2 | 76.0 | 622.2 | 163.1 | -0.2% | 4.5x | 17.1x |
| Act | 2023-Q3 | 170.1 | 39.7 | -4.7 | -5.6 | 54.1 | 36.4 | -17.5 | 73.7 | 728.3 | 163.1 | -2.5% | 3.7x | 29.2x |
| Act | 2023-Q2 | 167.4 | 68.2 | -2.9 | 6.3 | -61.5 | -94.2 | -32.6 | 31.1 | 745.2 | 163.6 | -1.5% | 6.6x | 25.9x |
| Act | 2023-Q1 | 143.7 | 17.5 | -3.4 | -26.5 | -6.0 | -110.6 | -104.4 | 24.3 | 683.9 | 163.1 | -1.3% | 2.1x | 29.3x |
| Act | 2022-Q4 | 118.5 | -8.4 | -60.8 | -70.8 | 41.1 | 24.9 | -16.2 | 121.2 | 640.6 | 163.0 | -24.9% | -1.1x | 30.6x |
| Act | 2022-Q3 | 152.9 | 13.0 | -21.8 | -27.7 | 23.2 | 11.9 | -11.1 | 95.8 | 596.1 | 163.0 | -8.9% | 2.2x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q2 | 185.4 | 45.9 | 5.4 | -1.4 | -31.5 | -69.0 | -20.6 | 87.4 | 586.0 | 163.0 | 3.3% | 8.0x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q1 | 126.5 | 24.7 | -10.2 | -15.5 | 63.6 | -73.5 | -75.8 | 98.7 | 542.3 | 163.0 | -4.3% | 4.3x | -- |
Multiples vs the company's own history — cheap or rich relative to itself? Historical fiscal years, then TTM, then forward projections (E). Forward rows hold today's price against projected earnings, so the multiple compresses if the company grows into it.
| Year | Price | Rev Gr | EBITDA % | EBITDA | EV/EBITDA | EV/FCF | P/E | P/S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 23.33 | — | 12.9% | 75 | 35.9× | n/m | n/m | 3.8× |
| 2023 | 20.38 | +11.2% | 28.4% | 184 | 20.1× | n/m | n/m | 4.9× |
| 2024 | 17.35 | +2.1% | 17.2% | 114 | 28.1× | n/m | n/m | 4.1× |
| 2025 | 15.92 | +0.7% | 34.5% | 230 | 13.9× | n/m | n/m | 3.9× |
| TTM | 21.01 | +5.6% | 35.3% | 231 | 0.0× | 0.0× | 0.0× | 0.0× |
| 2027E | 21.01 | -0.4% | 0.3% | 2 | 0.0× | 0.0× | n/m | 0.0× |
EBITDA in reporting-currency $M. Historical multiples use year-end market cap (split-adjusted price history); TTM & forward years use today's.
AI Analysis
LLM Evaluations
Manchester United is a globally iconic sports brand trapped in a deeply leveraged, operationally unprofitable structure. The club generates meaningful EBITDA (~£180-200M) but this is consumed by massive player registration CapEx (£120-180M/yr in transfer windows), interest expense on ~£750M+ of debt, and now a looming multi-billion pound stadium project. Without Champions League revenue, the business cannot self-fund and relies on player sales and credit facilities. The INEOS investment provides governance improvement and some capital, but the dual-class share structure leaves public shareholders powerless. At ~4.4x EV/EBITDA the stock appears optically cheap, but on an FCF basis the business is deeply negative with no clear path to positive FCF in the medium term. This is a speculative asset driven by on-pitch results, not a compounding equity investment.
Valuation & Metrics
Market Stats
TTM Financial Snapshot
DCF Fair Value Estimate
Forward Outlook & Risk
Short Interest
Options
| Strike | Call Bid/Ask | Call OI | Put Bid/Ask | Put OI |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $16.00 | $2.85/$5.80 | 0 | --/$2.20 | 0 |
| $17.00 | $1.95/$4.90 | 0 | --/$0.50 | 0 |
| $18.00 | $1.15/$4.00 | 2 | --/$2.50 | 0 |
| $19.00 | $0.45/$3.70 | 1 | --/$2.85 | 0 |
| $20.00 | $0.45/$2.15 | 0 | $0.45/$2.20 | 0 |
| $21.00 | $0.75/$3.20 | 4 | $1.10/$3.70 | 0 |
| $22.00 | --/$2.55 | 56 | $1.15/$4.40 | 0 |
| $23.00 | --/$2.65 | 0 | $2.00/$5.20 | 0 |
Forward Projections & Estimates
Employees
Cash Runway
Institutional Ownership
Headline & net flow
In Q1 2026 so far (quarter still filing), institutions are roughly balanced — bought 1.7% of float, sold 0.9%.
Ownership composition
Top holders
| Fund | $ value | Cost basis | Δ QoQ | Δ YoY | α life | Fund AUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ARIEL INVESTMENTS, LLC | $152M | $15.74 | +$1.1M | +$8.0M | -0.4% | $8.93B |
| Lindsell Train Ltd | $52.8M | $15.87 | −$7.6M | −$32.1M | -1.5% | $3.14B |
| COOPERMAN LEON G | $49.3M | $17.73 | +$168K | +$1.6M | +0.3% | $3.05B |
| PINNACLE ASSOCIATES LTD | $24.5M | $14.57 | +$892K | +$4.0M | -0.0% | $7.78B |
| BREACH INLET CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLC | $20.6M | $16.16 | +$0 | +$6.2M | -3.2% | $305M |
| Harvey Partners, LLC | $20.4M | $14.19 | +$1.8M | +$4.5M | +0.2% | $1.23B |
| GAMCO INVESTORS, INC. ET AL | $18.6M | $16.33 | +$9.8M | +$13.7M | -0.0% | $10.15B |
| Lancaster Investment Management | $16.4M | $16.35 | +$1.3M | +$1.6M | -1.2% | $180M |
| JANUS HENDERSON GROUP PLC | $10.9M | $16.45 | +$1.3M | +$672K | +1.2% | $209.29B |
| MORGAN STANLEY | $10.6M | $18.98 | +$2.7M | +$3.7M | -0.3% | $1.65T |
| GABELLI FUNDS LLC | $10.4M | $17.16 | +$2.2M | +$3.3M | -0.2% | $14.68B |
| UBS Group AG | $9.8M | $17.56 | +$195K | −$190K | -0.3% | $562.11B |
| D. E. Shaw & Co., Inc. | $8.6M | $16.30 | −$19K | +$8.4M | -0.3% | $118.02B |
| CI INVESTMENTS INC. | $7.1M | $19.55 | +$379K | −$1.3M | +0.1% | $20.62B |
| INFINITUM ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC | $6.2M | $17.18 | +$3.0M | +$0 | +0.1% | $799M |
| RENAISSANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC | $4.5M | $14.58 | +$866K | +$4.3M | +1.2% | $63.91B |
| JPMORGAN CHASE & CO | $4.3M | $15.76 | +$259K | +$1.2M | -0.2% | $1.47T |
| LPL Financial LLC | $3.8M | $16.40 | −$77K | +$2.0M | -0.2% | $372.65B |
| CITADEL ADVISORS LLC | $3.7M | $17.58 | −$2.4M | +$2K | -0.4% | $138.22B |
| NORTHERN TRUST CORPPassive | $3.6M | $14.83 | +$58K | −$2.0M | -0.2% | $755.34B |
Trading behavior
▸ Compare to holder-profile behavior (across all their stocks)
Biggest decreases this quarter
Top-5 holders · 62.8%
Top Holders Over Time
5-year share-count history (top 10 holders by peak, incl. exited) + price
Analyst Coverage
| Quarter | Revenue | EBITDA | Net Inc | EPS | EPS Range | # Analysts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 Q1 | 168M | 65M | -10M | $-0.06 | $-0.06 – $-0.05 | 1 |
| 2026 Q2 | 158M | 62M | -25M | $-0.14 | $-0.15 – $-0.13 | 1 |
| 2026 Q3 | 158M | 62M | -0M | $0.00 | $0.00 – $0.00 | 1 |
| 2026 Q4 | 235M | 92M | 33M | $0.19 | $0.18 – $0.20 | 1 |
| 2027 Q1 | 193M | 75M | 8M | $0.05 | $0.05 – $0.05 | 1 |
| 2027 Q2 | 171M | 67M | -19M | $-0.11 | $-0.12 – $-0.10 | 1 |
| 2027 Q3 | 168M | 65M | -9M | $-0.05 | $-0.06 – $-0.05 | 1 |
| 2027 Q4 | 261M | 102M | 46M | $0.27 | $0.25 – $0.29 | 1 |
| 2028 Q1 | 205M | 80M | 9M | $0.05 | $0.05 – $0.06 | 1 |
| 2028 Q2 | 174M | 68M | -13M | $-0.07 | $-0.08 – $-0.07 | 1 |
Corporate
Order Flow (FINRA, ~3w lag)
Revenue Breakdown
Revenue Segments
| Commercial | $224.2M | +16% |
| Broadcasting | $150.3M | +17% |
| Sponsorship | $139.1M | +23% |
| Matchday | $106.5M | +40% |
| Broadcasting Other | $4.6M | -7% |
Filing Risk Analysis
Filing Risk Scores
Manchester United plc: Financial engineering masking a structural reliance on player sales and credit lines
Counter-Thesis
Counter-Thesis & Recent News
Manchester United recently reported a significant turnaround in its Q2 Fiscal 2026 results (February 2026), swinging to an operating profit of £0.7 million compared to a £66.2 million loss in the prior year. Revenue for the quarter reached £190.3 million, and management reiterated its FY2026 adjusted EBITDA guidance of £180M–£200M. Additionally, Sir Jim Ratcliffe (INEOS) increased his ownership stake to 28.94% in late 2024, finalizing a $300 million infrastructure investment. (Sources: Goal.com, Intellectia AI, The Guardian)
Bears are largely focused on the club's fall to 8th in the Deloitte Football Money League (2026) and a projected £50 million decrease in broadcast revenue due to a lack of Champions League football. Short sellers argue the $2 billion stadium project is too capital-intensive and lacks a clear timeline, while the current P/E ratio remains deeply negative, making the stock appear overvalued relative to traditional cash flow metrics. (Sources: Football Ground Guide, MarketBeat)
The club faces significant fan and public relations backlash following mid-season ticket price increases and the removal of concessions for children and pensioners. Internal cost-cutting measures, including the termination of 250 employees and ending Sir Alex Ferguson’s multi-million pound ambassadorial role, have raised concerns about brand dilution and potential long-term damage to the club’s 'heritage' value. (Source: The Guardian)
Domestic rivals like Manchester City and Liverpool continue to dominate the Premier League, creating a cycle where United struggles to secure the lucrative Champions League qualification necessary to sustain its high wage bill. Beyond the pitch, United competes for global 'entertainment' dollars with high-growth US entities like Atlanta Braves Holdings (BATR.K) and Madison Square Garden Entertainment (MSGE). (Source: Simply Wall St)
Sentiment is currently polarized. Fans are optimistic about the 'football first' leadership of CEO Omar Berrada and new manager Ruben Amorim (appointed Nov 2024), viewing them as catalysts for a cultural reset. However, this is balanced by intense frustration over rising matchday costs and the 'corporatization' of the club’s identity under INEOS's austerity regime. (Sources: The Mirror, The Guardian)