VRM
Vroom, Inc.Vroom, Inc. operates as an e-commerce used automotive retailer in the United States. It operates end-to-end ecommerce platform for buying, selling, transporting, reconditioning, pricing, financing, registering, and delivering vehicles. The company was formerly known as Auto America, Inc. and changed its name to Vroom, Inc. in July 2015. The company was incorporated in 2012 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
2-Year Price History
Quarterly Financials & Projections
| Period | Rev | EBITDA | OpIn | NI | OCF | FCF | CapEx | Cash | Debt | Shares | ROIC | IntCov | EV/EBITDA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Est | 2027-Q4 | 4.5 | -0.2 | -- | -1.6 | -- | -0.7 | -0.0 | -1.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q3 | 5.0 | -0.4 | -- | -2.0 | -- | -0.9 | -0.1 | -0.4 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q2 | 5.5 | -0.6 | -- | -2.5 | -- | -1.1 | -0.1 | 0.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q1 | 6.0 | -0.7 | -- | -3.0 | -- | -1.5 | -0.1 | 1.6 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q4 | 6.5 | -1.0 | -- | -3.6 | -- | -2.0 | -0.1 | 3.1 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q3 | 7.0 | -1.3 | -- | -4.2 | -- | -2.5 | -0.1 | 5.0 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q2 | 7.5 | -1.5 | -- | -4.9 | -- | -3.0 | -0.2 | 7.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q1 | 8.0 | -2.0 | -- | -6.0 | -- | -4.0 | -0.2 | 10.5 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Act | 2026-Q1 | 25.0 | -4.2 | -5.6 | -19.1 | 18.6 | 14.4 | -1.5 | 14.5 | 774.8 | 5.2 | -2.5% | -0.3x | -- |
| Act | 2025-Q4 | 28.4 | 3.3 | 2.3 | -11.4 | 21.3 | 17.5 | -1.7 | 10.4 | 779.5 | 5.2 | 1.0% | 0.1x | -- |
| Act | 2025-Q3 | -0.0 | -12.0 | -18.8 | -26.8 | 19.7 | 15.5 | -2.2 | 12.4 | 781.4 | 5.2 | -8.1% | -17.0x | -- |
| Act | 2025-Q2 | 0.0 | 5.7 | -23.9 | -8.5 | 17.7 | 14.5 | -1.7 | 14.3 | 779.3 | 5.2 | -9.9% | 0.4x | -- |
| Act | 2025-Q1 | 0.0 | 5.9 | -22.0 | -6.4 | 16.8 | 14.2 | -1.5 | 14.6 | 779.8 | 5.2 | -9.1% | 0.5x | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q4 | 2.8 | -13.2 | -107.2 | -36.6 | -22.1 | -23.5 | -1.4 | 29.3 | 752.3 | 1.8 | -57.0% | -0.8x | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q3 | 2.9 | -13.6 | -5.8 | -39.7 | -31.7 | -32.9 | -1.2 | 51.1 | 1,063 | 1.8 | -2.2% | -0.8x | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q2 | 60.9 | 9.5 | 28.2 | -21.2 | -66.3 | -66.6 | -0.3 | 63.4 | 1,077 | 1.8 | 10.5% | 0.6x | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q1 | 49.2 | -13.7 | 17.1 | -67.6 | 23.1 | 22.5 | -0.6 | 91.0 | 1,074 | 1.8 | 6.2% | -0.9x | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q4 | 235.9 | -48.4 | -106.9 | -141.3 | -108.1 | -111.3 | -3.3 | 140.1 | 1,233 | 1.8 | -34.6% | -3.3x | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q3 | 235.6 | -58.7 | -42.5 | -82.9 | -193.5 | -194.2 | -0.7 | 213.9 | 1,262 | 1.8 | -13.5% | -4.9x | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q2 | 53.5 | 1.5 | -52.6 | -66.0 | -147.1 | -147.5 | -0.4 | 244.5 | 1,120 | 1.7 | -18.8% | -- | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q1 | 196.5 | -63.0 | -68.3 | -75.0 | -85.0 | -85.8 | -0.8 | 324.7 | 1,115 | 1.7 | -24.5% | -7.2x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q4 | 209.4 | 50.0 | -77.6 | 24.8 | -86.0 | -90.2 | -4.3 | 419.5 | 985.8 | 1.7 | -29.7% | 4.1x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q3 | 340.8 | -30.5 | -78.2 | -51.1 | 114.4 | 110.5 | -3.9 | 533.6 | 1,172 | 1.7 | -26.0% | -3.1x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q2 | 475.4 | -95.2 | -100.1 | -115.1 | -122.4 | -137.8 | -9.0 | 546.1 | 1,438 | 1.7 | -26.4% | -10.0x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q1 | 923.8 | -316.4 | -315.9 | -310.5 | -15.1 | -22.2 | -7.1 | 616.3 | 1,413 | 1.7 | -72.7% | -33.7x | -- |
Multiples vs the company's own history — cheap or rich relative to itself? Historical fiscal years, then TTM, then forward projections (E). Forward rows hold today's price against projected earnings, so the multiple compresses if the company grows into it.
| Year | Price | Rev Gr | EBITDA % | EBITDA | EV/EBITDA | EV/FCF | P/E | P/S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 81.60 | — | -20.1% | -392 | — | — | — | — |
| 2023 | 48.20 | -63.0% | -23.4% | -169 | — | — | — | — |
| 2024 | 5.20 | -84.0% | -26.7% | -31 | — | — | — | — |
| 2025 | 19.88 | -75.5% | 10.4% | 3 | — | — | — | — |
| TTM | 11.80 | -19.9% | -13.5% | -7 | 0.0× | 0.0× | 0.0× | 0.0× |
| 2026E | 11.80 | -45.6% | -0.2% | -0 | n/m | n/m | 0.0× | 0.0× |
| 2027E | 11.80 | -27.6% | -0.1% | -0 | n/m | n/m | 0.0× | 0.0× |
EBITDA in reporting-currency $M. Historical multiples use year-end market cap (split-adjusted price history); TTM & forward years use today's.
AI Analysis
LLM Evaluations
Vroom is a post-bankruptcy zombie entity running off a subprime auto loan portfolio with $12.4M in cash, $823M in liabilities, and total dependence on a single related-party lender who also controls 76.5% of equity. The retail business is dead, CarStory generates negligible revenue (~$5M annualized), and the finance receivable portfolio is in permanent runoff. Management awarded themselves 15% of post-restructuring equity while prior shareholders were wiped out. With 186% annual dilution, critical interest coverage (-0.32x), and Level 3 mark-to-model accounting on virtually all assets, there is no credible path to equity value creation for minority shareholders. This is a controlled liquidation masquerading as a going concern, and the $66M market cap reflects speculative premium over likely recovery value of near zero for common equity.
Valuation & Metrics
Market Stats
TTM Financial Snapshot
DCF Fair Value Estimate
Forward Outlook & Risk
Short Interest
Forward Projections & Estimates
Employees
Institutional Ownership
Headline & net flow
In Q1 2026 so far (quarter still filing), institutions are roughly balanced — bought 1.8% of float, sold 1.8%. 2 filers moved >1% of shares (1 buying, 1 selling).
Ownership composition
Top holders
| Fund | $ value | Cost basis | Δ QoQ | Δ YoY | α life | Fund AUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | $52.8M | $6.09 | +$0 | +$200K | -26.4% | $174M |
| SILVERBACK ASSET MANAGEMENT LLC | $5.8M | $6.53 | +$166K | +$174K | +6.5% | $48.8M |
| BANK OF AMERICA CORP /DE/ | $3.3M | $6.03 | −$13K | −$299K | -0.1% | $1.36T |
| MILLER VALUE PARTNERS, LLC | $778K | $13.31 | +$778K | +$778K | +1.1% | $383M |
| MARSHALL WACE, LLP | $645K | $6.00 | +$0 | −$45K | +0.6% | $92.71B |
| BlackRock, Inc.Passive | $558K | $28.23 | −$9K | +$558K | -0.2% | $5.69T |
| GEODE CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, LLCPassive | $398K | $25.79 | +$65K | +$398K | +2.3% | $1.61T |
| Catterton Management Company, L.L.C. | $306K | $6.00 | +$0 | +$0 | -14.3% | $3.61B |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLCPassive | $179K | $13.31 | +$179K | +$179K | — | $4.04T |
| NISA INVESTMENT ADVISORS, LLC | $126K | $6.00 | +$0 | +$0 | -0.5% | $27.04B |
| VANGUARD FIDUCIARY TRUST COPassive | $88K | $13.31 | +$88K | +$88K | — | $395.83B |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLCPassive | $81K | $13.31 | +$81K | +$81K | — | $1.91T |
| Russell Investments Group, Ltd. | $80K | $17.26 | +$57K | +$80K | +1.5% | $93.03B |
| NEW YORK STATE COMMON RETIREMENT FUND | $48K | $28.51 | +$0 | +$48K | +1.3% | $71.52B |
| FMR LLC | $34K | $14.69 | +$28K | +$34K | -0.0% | $1.89T |
| UBS Group AG | $21K | $14.44 | +$7K | +$9K | -0.3% | $562.11B |
| Tower Research Capital LLC (TRC)MM | $13K | $22.42 | +$7K | +$13K | -0.6% | $3.84B |
| RHUMBLINE ADVISERS | $12K | $28.38 | +$0 | +$12K | +0.4% | $116.90B |
| MORGAN STANLEY | $7K | $11.93 | −$8K | −$7K | -0.3% | $1.65T |
| MIRAE ASSET GLOBAL ETFS HOLDINGS Ltd. | $7K | $28.51 | +$0 | +$7K | +1.7% | $73.71B |
Trading behavior
▸ Compare to holder-profile behavior (across all their stocks)
Biggest decreases this quarter
New buyers this quarter
Top-5 holders · 97.0%
Top Holders Over Time
5-year share-count history (top 10 holders by peak, incl. exited) + price
Analyst Coverage
| Quarter | Revenue | EBITDA | Net Inc | EPS | EPS Range | # Analysts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 Q4 | 268M | -102M | -111M | $-50.53 | $-50.53 – $-50.53 | 1 |
| 2023 Q1 | 255M | -451M | -443M | $-44.64 | $-44.64 – $-44.64 | 1 |
| 2023 Q2 | 226M | -82M | -92M | $-40.80 | $-40.80 – $-40.80 | 1 |
| 2023 Q3 | 244M | -112M | -125M | $-35.93 | $-37.77 – $-34.09 | 2 |
| 2023 Q4 | 232M | -112M | -122M | $-29.60 | $-29.60 – $-29.60 | 1 |
| 2024 Q1 | 235M | -497M | -487M | $-45.60 | $-45.60 – $-45.60 | 1 |
| 2024 Q2 | 255M | -53M | -191M | $-36.80 | $-36.80 – $-36.80 | 1 |
| 2024 Q3 | 267M | -56M | -150M | $-28.80 | $-28.80 – $-28.80 | 1 |
| 2024 Q4 | 294M | -61M | -229M | $-44.00 | $-44.00 – $-44.00 | 1 |
| 2025 Q3 | -0M | 0M | 0M | $0.00 | $0.00 – $0.00 | 0 |
Corporate
Executive Compensation (2023-2025)
Insider Trading (last 12mo)
| Date | Side | Insider | Title | Shares | Price | Dollars | Owned $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-08 | SELL | Corrales Anna-Lisa Christina | officer: CLO, CCO, Secretary | 35 | $12.20 | $427 | $379K |
| 2026-03-20 | SELL | Benzaquen Jacob Shlomo | officer: Principal Accounting Officer | 7 | $12.07 | $84 | $124K |
| 2026-03-20 | SELL | Corrales Anna-Lisa Christina | officer: CLO, CCO, Secretary | 18 | $12.07 | $217 | $375K |
| 2025-09-15 | SELL | Benzaquen Jacob Shlomo | officer: Principal Accounting Officer | 3 | $26.07 | $78 | $269K |
| 2025-06-11 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 3,649 | $28.00 | $102K | $111.08M |
| 2025-06-10 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 13 | $28.00 | $364 | $110.98M |
| 2025-06-09 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 1,790 | $27.99 | $50K | $110.93M |
| 2025-06-06 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 1,781 | $27.99 | $50K | $110.90M |
| 2025-06-05 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 999 | $24.48 | $24K | $96.92M |
| 2025-06-04 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 4,788 | $25.80 | $124K | $102.13M |
| 2025-06-03 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 1,000 | $24.88 | $25K | $98.39M |
| 2025-06-02 | BUY | Mudrick Capital Management, L.P. | 10 percent owner | 1,000 | $24.13 | $24K | $95.39M |
| 2025-05-28 | SELL | Benzaquen Jacob Shlomo | officer: Principal Accounting Officer | 8 | $23.65 | $189 | $244K |
| 2025-05-28 | SELL | Corrales Anna-Lisa Christina | officer: CLO, CCO, Secretary | 12 | $23.65 | $284 | $735K |
Order Flow (FINRA, ~3w lag)
Filing Risk Analysis
Filing Risk Scores
Vroom, Inc.: High-Octane Insolvency Risk Masked by Fresh Start Accounting and Insider Lifelines
Counter-Thesis
Counter-Thesis & Recent News
Vroom successfully emerged from a prepackaged Chapter 11 reorganization on January 14, 2025, effectively eliminating roughly $290 million in unsecured debt. Since then, the company has pivoted to an asset-light model focused on United Auto Credit (UACC) and CarStory. Recent catalysts include the completion of UACC's 17th subprime auto loan securitization in February 2026 and a $10.5M note purchase agreement in November 2025 to bolster liquidity. (Sources: Vroom Investor Relations, TipRanks)
The core bear thesis rests on Vroom's exposure to the subprime lending market through UACC, which is highly sensitive to rising delinquency rates and a volatile interest rate environment. Despite shedding debt, the company still faces narrow liquidity margins, with year-end 2025 projections hovering between $35 million and $50 million. Bears argue the transition from a high-volume retailer to a niche fintech/SaaS player lacks the scale to reach long-term profitability. (Sources: Simply Wall St, MarketBeat)
The primary red flag is the company's recent bankruptcy history and the 'gut-wrenching' 90% workforce reduction executed during the retail wind-down. Furthermore, several analysts maintain a 'Sell' rating, citing a predicted downside and the risk of 'fresh-start' accounting masking underlying operational weaknesses. The stock's extreme volatility and its status as a micro-cap ($66.9M market cap) remain high-risk factors. (Sources: Fintel, Seeking Alpha)
Now operating as a B2B provider, Vroom faces stiff competition from established automotive lenders (e.g., Ally Financial, Capital One) and specialized fintechs. In the AI analytics space, CarStory must compete with data giants like Cox Automotive (Kelley Blue Book/Autotrader) and JD Power, who have deeper dealer integrations and larger data sets for predictive valuation. (Sources: Porter's Five Forces Analysis, Matrix BCG)
Sentiment is currently in a state of transition. While retail customer sentiment was historically poor—marked by thousands of BBB complaints regarding title delays and poor vehicle condition—the pivot to a B2B model shifts the focus to dealer satisfaction. Initial reports suggest dealers value UACC's financing flexibility, but the brand still carries the 'stigma' of its retail failure, which could hinder new white-label partnership growth. (Sources: NBC KPRC, CBS News Texas)