JAN
Janus Living, Inc.Janus Living, Inc. operates as a pure-play senior housing real estate investment trust. It owns communities across the United States that support residents with thoughtfully designed, highly amenitized environments. The company was founded in December 2025 and is headquartered in Denver, CO.
2-Year Price History
Quarterly Financials & Projections
| Period | Rev | EBITDA | OpIn | NI | OCF | FCF | CapEx | Cash | Debt | Shares | ROIC | IntCov | EV/EBITDA | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Est | 2027-Q2 | 4.0 | -4.4 | -- | -6.8 | -- | -3.6 | -0.0 | 1,013 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2027-Q1 | 3.5 | -4.2 | -- | -6.3 | -- | -3.5 | -0.0 | 1,016 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q4 | 6.0 | -3.9 | -- | -6.6 | -- | -3.0 | -0.0 | 1,020 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q3 | 4.5 | -4.1 | -- | -6.3 | -- | -3.2 | -0.0 | 1,023 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q2 | 5.5 | -4.1 | -- | -7.2 | -- | -3.0 | -0.0 | 1,026 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2026-Q1 | 4.0 | -4.0 | -- | -6.0 | -- | -3.2 | -0.0 | 1,029 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Act | 2026-Q1 | 200.3 | 80.8 | 1.1 | 31.3 | 33.3 | 13.3 | -20.0 | 1,038 | 0.0 | 187.2 | 0.1% | 230.0x | -- |
| Est | 2025-Q4 | 7.0 | -3.5 | -- | -6.3 | -- | -2.8 | -0.0 | 1,032 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Est | 2025-Q3 | 5.0 | -4.0 | -- | -6.0 | -- | -3.0 | -0.0 | 1,035 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Act | 2025-Q2 | 6.4 | -5.5 | -5.5 | -9.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | -0.0 | 9.6 | 22.2 | 18.6 | -42.0% | -10.0x | -- |
| Act | 2025-Q1 | 5.5 | -2.2 | -2.2 | -2.9 | -1.5 | -1.5 | -0.0 | 10.8 | 13.7 | 0.2 | -21.6% | -3.0x | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q4 | 12.5 | -1.5 | -1.9 | 18.7 | 1.4 | 1.4 | -0.0 | 7.2 | 12.5 | 11.2 | -12.5% | -1.7x | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q2 | 2.2 | -2.8 | -2.9 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.1 | -0.0 | 5.8 | 10.5 | 8.4 | -19.5% | -- | -- |
| Act | 2024-Q1 | 0.0 | -1.8 | -1.8 | -2.1 | -0.5 | -0.5 | -0.0 | 0.1 | 2.9 | 6.3 | -42.8% | -- | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q4 | 0.0 | -1.4 | -1.8 | -14.2 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.0 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 5.0 | -37.3% | -- | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q3 | 0.0 | -0.1 | -0.8 | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.4 | -0.0 | 0.4 | 0.0 | 4.2 | -14.3% | -- | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q2 | 0.0 | 0.8 | -1.1 | 0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 3.7 | -20.6% | 2.2x | -- |
| Act | 2023-Q1 | 0.0 | -0.5 | -1.1 | -0.7 | 2.4 | 2.3 | -0.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | 3.2 | -17.0% | -1.0x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q4 | 11.2 | 3.4 | 3.1 | -6.2 | -0.7 | -1.8 | -0.6 | 0.1 | 12.5 | 3.2 | 34.0% | 0.4x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q3 | 8.6 | -1.5 | -1.8 | -2.1 | -3.9 | -4.6 | -0.0 | 0.9 | 12.3 | 3.2 | -35.1% | -41.0x | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q2 | 10.5 | -0.8 | -1.3 | 10.7 | -0.6 | -1.4 | -0.8 | 1.2 | 7.1 | 3.5 | -28.2% | -- | -- |
| Act | 2022-Q1 | 9.3 | -3.4 | -1.1 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 1.8 | -0.1 | 2.3 | 5.7 | 3.3 | -76.6% | -- | -- |
Multiples vs the company's own history — cheap or rich relative to itself? Historical fiscal years, then TTM, then forward projections (E). Forward rows hold today's price against projected earnings, so the multiple compresses if the company grows into it.
| Year | Price | Rev Gr | EBITDA % | EBITDA | EV/EBITDA | EV/FCF | P/E | P/S |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | — | — | -5.8% | -2 | — | — | — | — |
| 2023 | — | -100.0% | — | -1 | — | — | — | — |
| TTM | 26.77 | +10262.8% | 31.9% | 72 | 0.0× | 0.0× | 0.0× | 0.0× |
| 2026E | 26.77 | -91.1% | -0.8% | -0 | n/m | n/m | n/m | 0.0× |
EBITDA in reporting-currency $M. Historical multiples use year-end market cap (split-adjusted price history); TTM & forward years use today's.
AI Analysis
LLM Evaluations
JAN is a deeply distressed micro-cap with a toxic capital structure featuring predatory 48% APR debt, going concern warnings, a 194% annual dilution rate, SEC fraud settlement history, and entrenched related-party governance issues involving the CEO's family. Revenue is tiny ($26M TTM), erratic, and from a thin-margin fintech business, while the biotech segment is dormant. The $208M market cap is divorced from any reasonable fundamental valuation - common equity is likely worth near zero given preferred stock priority, compounding debt obligations, and negative working capital. This is a textbook 'strong sell' with significant risk of total loss for common shareholders.
Valuation & Metrics
Market Stats
TTM Financial Snapshot
DCF Fair Value Estimate
Forward Outlook & Risk
Short Interest
Forward Projections & Estimates
Employees
Institutional Ownership
Headline & net flow
Ownership composition
Top holders
| Fund | $ value | Cost basis | Δ QoQ | Δ YoY | α life | Fund AUM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MASSACHUSETTS FINANCIAL SERVICES CO /MA/ | $110M | $23.57 | +$103M | +$110M | — | $297.48B |
| PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC | $78.2M | $23.57 | +$78.2M | +$78.2M | — | $81.20B |
| Long Pond Capital, LP | $77.5M | $23.57 | +$77.5M | +$77.5M | — | $978M |
| BlackRock, Inc.Passive | $70.3M | $23.57 | +$70.3M | +$70.3M | — | $5.69T |
| DEUTSCHE BANK AG\ | $69.5M | $23.57 | +$69.5M | +$69.5M | — | $302.17B |
| CENTERSQUARE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT LLC | $46.7M | $23.57 | +$46.7M | +$46.7M | — | $9.67B |
| CITADEL ADVISORS LLC | $40.3M | $23.57 | +$40.3M | +$40.3M | — | $138.22B |
| VANGUARD PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT LLCPassive | $39.8M | $23.57 | +$39.8M | +$39.8M | — | $1.91T |
| Invesco Ltd. | $36.5M | $23.57 | +$36.5M | +$36.5M | — | $652.04B |
| PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC | $36.4M | $23.57 | +$36.4M | +$36.4M | — | $186.29B |
| VANGUARD CAPITAL MANAGEMENT LLCPassive | $36.2M | $23.57 | +$36.2M | +$36.2M | — | $4.04T |
| Alyeska Investment Group, L.P. | $34.2M | $23.57 | +$34.2M | +$34.2M | — | $35.33B |
| Nuveen, LLC | $33.6M | $23.57 | +$33.6M | +$33.6M | — | $368.63B |
| JANUS HENDERSON GROUP PLC | $32.0M | $23.57 | +$32.1M | +$32.0M | — | $209.29B |
| Conversant Capital LLC | $28.5M | $23.57 | +$28.5M | +$28.5M | — | $725M |
| JPMORGAN CHASE & CO | $25.5M | $23.57 | +$26.3M | +$25.5M | — | $1.47T |
| GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC | $21.2M | $23.57 | +$21.2M | +$21.2M | — | $760.93B |
| Holocene Advisors, LP | $19.4M | $23.57 | +$19.4M | +$19.4M | — | $41.28B |
| Ghisallo Capital Management LLC | $17.7M | $23.57 | +$17.7M | +$17.7M | — | $2.56B |
| Resolution Capital Ltd | $15.9M | $23.57 | +$15.9M | +$15.9M | — | $4.76B |
Trading behavior
New buyers this quarter
Top-5 holders · 32.3%
Top Holders Over Time
5-year share-count history (top 10 holders by peak, incl. exited) + price
Analyst Coverage
| Quarter | Revenue | EBITDA | Net Inc | EPS | EPS Range | # Analysts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 Q3 | 235M | 48M | 19M | $0.10 | $0.10 – $0.11 | 2 |
| 2026 Q4 | 247M | 51M | 21M | $0.11 | $0.10 – $0.12 | 1 |
| 2027 Q1 | 269M | 55M | 14M | $0.07 | $0.07 – $0.08 | 1 |
| 2027 Q2 | 285M | 59M | 15M | $0.08 | $0.07 – $0.08 | 1 |
| 2027 Q3 | 295M | 60M | 14M | $0.07 | $0.07 – $0.08 | 1 |
| 2027 Q4 | 306M | 63M | 15M | $0.08 | $0.08 – $0.09 | 1 |
| 2028 Q1 | 339M | 69M | 0M | $0.00 | $0.00 – $0.00 | 1 |
| 2028 Q2 | 350M | 72M | 0M | $0.00 | $0.00 – $0.00 | 1 |
| 2028 Q3 | 360M | 74M | 0M | $0.00 | $0.00 – $0.00 | 1 |
| 2028 Q4 | 372M | 76M | 0M | $0.00 | $0.00 – $0.00 | 1 |
Corporate
Insider Trading (last 12mo)
| Date | Side | Insider | Title | Shares | Price | Dollars | Owned $ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-23 | BUY | Arabia John V | director | 60,000 | $20.00 | $1.20M | $1.35M |
| 2026-03-23 | BUY | Brinker Scott M | director, officer: PRESIDENT & CEO | 100,000 | $20.00 | $2.00M | $2.00M |
| 2026-03-23 | BUY | HERMAN CHARLES J JR | director | 5,500 | $20.00 | $110K | $260K |
| 2026-03-23 | BUY | Miller Jeffrey H | officer: CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER | 7,500 | $20.00 | $150K | $150K |
| 2026-03-23 | BUY | Olsen Denise | director | 500 | $20.00 | $10K | $160K |
| 2026-03-23 | BUY | Sandstrom Katherine M | director | 13,500 | $20.00 | $270K | $420K |
Order Flow (FINRA, ~3w lag)
Revenue Breakdown
Revenue Segments
| Resident Fees and Services | $200.3M | NEW |
Filing Risk Analysis
Filing Risk Scores
Janus Living, Inc.: A Carve-Out REIT with Non-Cash Earnings and Significant Parent Overhang
Counter-Thesis
Counter-Thesis & Recent News
Janus Living (JAN) went public in March 2026 with an $840 million IPO, but has quickly drawn skepticism. In April 2026, market analysts at Benzinga flagged JAN as one of the 'Top 2 Real Estate Stocks That May Collapse,' citing extreme technical overextension with a Relative Strength Index (RSI) above 70. Additionally, the company announced it will report Q1 2026 earnings on May 5, 2026, which is being viewed by bears as a potential negative catalyst for a downward re-rating if occupancy or margin growth misses expectations (MarketBeat, Benzinga).
The bear case centers on a 'demanding' valuation and poor income profile for a REIT. Trading at 25x adjusted FFO with a meager 2.4% dividend yield, JAN is priced at a premium that many analysts believe is unsustainable given the high-interest-rate environment. The portfolio is dangerously concentrated, with 70% of its communities located in just two states—Texas and Florida—leaving it highly exposed to regional economic downturns or regulatory shifts in those specific markets (Seeking Alpha). Furthermore, its RIDEA operating structure exposes the company to direct operational costs, unlike traditional triple-net lease models, making it more vulnerable to labor inflation.
Simply Wall St highlights a 'mediocre balance sheet with a questionable track record' and notes that shares are highly illiquid, which could exacerbate price drops during a sell-off. There is also a significant concern regarding the relationship with its parent company, Healthpeak Properties (DOC), which retains a majority stake and serves as the external manager, creating potential conflicts of interest regarding asset transfers and management fees. The company has less than three years of independent financial data, making long-term performance difficult to project.
JAN faces intense competition from established healthcare REITs such as Sabra Health Care REIT (SBRA), CareTrust REIT (CTRE), and National Health Investors (NHI). Unlike these peers, which have diversified healthcare portfolios, JAN is a 'pure-play' senior housing operator, making it the most vulnerable in the sector to any shifts in Medicare/Medicaid policy or spikes in nursing labor costs. Additionally, the rise of value-based care (VBC) partnerships is pressuring traditional operators to increase capital expenditures to keep pace with clinical integration (NIC.org).
While resident-specific sentiment data is limited due to the company's recent formation, industry risk assessments for the JAN portfolio highlight ongoing concerns regarding 'reputation management' and 'regulatory survey risk.' In the broader senior living sector, customer sentiment is frequently impacted by staffing shortages and the rising cost of care, which JAN is directly exposed to under its RIDEA structure. Analysts have noted that any 'family complaints' or 'quality of care' issues would immediately impair the REIT's ability to maintain its 85% occupancy rate (RiskMap).